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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALLACE L. ROSANDER, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
-vs.-
REX A. LARSEN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9672 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff owned property on which he was building 
a home. Defendant was the contractor, but plaintiff had 
reserved the right : 
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(a) T'o perform labor in his off hours from his 
regular employment, for which defendant had 
agreed to credit plaintiff towards the re-
duction of the total construction cost. 
(b) To secure sub-contracts or materials cheaper 
than the bid of defendant, in which event the 
savings were credited to plaintiff. 
While working on the building construction, plaintiff 
was injured and filed suit against defendant to recov-er 
damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At Pre-trial (R-33) the Honorable Ray Van Cott, 
Jr., agreed with defendant that "plaintiff maintained 
control over the construction by reserving the right to 
order materials and to sublet work on the building; that 
he would do his own work in which he would get a dis-
count in the construction cost and, therefore, plaintiff 
was in control of the property and cannot be an employee 
of himself; also for the further reason that from the ad-
mitted facts there is no duty owed to this man by this de-
fendant and there is no showing of any negligence on 
the part of the defendant." 
The plaintiff's amended complaint was therefore 
dismissed. 
STATEl\1ENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff was the owner of realty upon which 
he was constructing a home. 
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The defendant had agreed in writing to construct 
the said home as general contractor. 
I-Iowever, the plaintiff and defendant had further 
agreed that plaintiff, when not working in his regular 
employment (Depo, 6), personally could perform labor 
upon said construction, and receive a credit against the 
total contract price for the total time plaintiff personally 
performed labor. 
In addition, the oral understanding provided that 
the plaintiff could secure subcontracts, and materials 
at a price lower than the bid of defendant, in which event 
the savings effected would be also credited on the total 
contract price. (R.13) 
On Septernber 4th, 1959, the plaintiff in the absence 
of the defendant (Depo. 15), came on the site and per-
fanned carpenter labor for approximately one half hour 
(R. 8). It was approximately 2 o'clock P.M. and daylight 
(R. 7). The home was in the stage of construction where 
the frame work was up and the sub flooring was installed 
(R.13). The roof was not on. (Depo.10). 
At the above time and immediately before the acci-
dent plaintiff climbed up one of the walls for the purpose 
of performing labor on the rafters which were being in-
stalled. 
Upon reaching the ceiling area, he took hold of a 
rafter in an effort to pull himself up. The rafter was 
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not fastened and gave way and as a result plaintiff fell. 
While falling, he passed through a stairway opening and 
fell through it into the basement. (Pre-Trial Order R. 12-
15). 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RE.-
QUIRED PLAINTIFF TO MAKE AN ELEC-
TION. 
2 Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd Edition, par. 8.33, 
page 170, after having noted that inconsistent pleadings 
are allowed, states : 
''It should be noted that hypothetical and alter-
native pleadings are subject to the requirements 
of Rule 11 as to honesty in pleading; this is under-
scored in the last sentence of Rule 8 (e) (2). The 
pleader is not at liberty to set forth variant state-
ments of hiJs claim or defense unless he is honestly 
,in doubt as to what the eviJdence will show." (em-
phasis added). 
The plaintiff from the outset of this suit showed a 
noticeable allergy to divulging that he was the owner of 
the property on which he was injured. vV e, therefore, 
test the ''honesty in pleading" which is required. 
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ORIGINAL COMPLAINT. 
Par. 2, (R-1) 
"On or about the 4th day of September 1959· the 
defendant was in possession of certain premises 
under construction . . . incident to a contract 
between the defendant and the owner of the said 
lot .... " 
Par. 3. (R-1) 
"The defendant invited plaintiff to come upon 
said lot ... said invitation being issued by defend-
ant incident to business relationships between 
plaintiff and defendant. . . . " 
The plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed after the 
first Pre-·Trial conference, contains exactly the same alle-
gations in the First and Second Causes of Action (R-2.6, 
27). The Third Cause of Action (R-28) which presumably 
injects a new theory, the plaintiff's hiding of ownership 
continues: 
" . said possession being incident to a contract 
between the defendant and the owner of said lot. 
" 
Not once in the pleadings does it appear that the 
plaintiff was indeed the owner of the property. 
This lack of candor permeates the entire file. 
Defendant served plaintiff with Request for Admis-
sions, (R-4) 
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"1. That each of the following statements are 
true: 
(a) Plantiff was the owner of the dwelling 
being constructed. '' 
ANSWER (R-7) 
''Plaintiff declines to admit the allegations con-
tained in I (a) on the ground that plaintiff is ad-
vised that the owners of the land upon which the 
dwelling was being constructed are plaintiff and 
his wife and the defendant was in possession of 
the dwelling as such, as general contractor. Plain-
tiff is advised that the question as to the owner-
ship of the said dwelling during ... construction 
is a question of law and plaintiff is therefore 
unable to answer the same." 
The answers were signed by plaintiff's attorney. 
Even when the cat was out of the bag, and the obvi-
ous had to be faced, plaintiff filed an affidavit, (R-16) 
and again, attempting to circumvent the fact of owner-
ship, stated: 
'''That he . . . was present . . . on said premises 
not as the owner . . . but pursuant to a contract 
with defendant ... His presence on said premises 
had no connection with the fact that he was the 
fee title owner ... and his only object in going to 
said premises was to do work on the home pur-
suant to said contract." 
May we be excused for being confused~ The "con-
tract" was the arrangement whereby plaintiff retained 
the right to perform labor in order to reduce the con-
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
struction costs to the "owner'' (plaintiff) as fully recited 
in the Pre-Trial Order (R-13), and in plaintiff's Answers 
to Request for Admissions, (R-7-8). How can he, then, 
sign an honest affidavit, under oath, that he was working 
pursuant to said "contract" yet it had no connection with 
the fact that he was the owner~ 
Moore's Federal Practice, again states, at page 1709 : 
"All pleadings, of course, must be clear and un-
derstandable." 
''The Courts in a number of cases have condemned 
pleadings in which alternative or inconsistent 
allegations or theories were so intermingled that 
the Court was unable to determine what the plead-
er was getting at." 
The Lower Court certainly can demand honest plead-
ings. An allegation that plaintiff was the owner, but not 
the owner, certainly cannot be countenanced, anymore 
than an allegation that plaintiff was the driver of a car, 
yet was not driving. Defendant is certainly willing to 
play the game, but plaintiff ought to be required to at 
least stay on the field. 
The Lower Court therefore, was justified in com-
pelling plaintiff to elect whether he was alleging that 
he was the owner, or whether he was an employee. 
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PoiNT II. 
REGARDLESS OF T'HE QUESTION OF 
ELECTION, DE.FENDANT WAS ENTITLED 
TO A DISMISSAL OF ALL THREE CAUSES 
OF ACTION ADVANCED BY PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff's .Amended Complaint advances, it is al-
leged, three theories. These are difficult to understand, 
but in substance are : 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 
Plaintiff was an invitee on to his own premises. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: 
Plaintiff was on his own premises with the permis-
sion of the defendant. 
T'HIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: 
Plaintiff was an employee in the construction of his 
own home. 
This however, is a negligence action and we look 
first to defendant's contention that plaintiff's .Amended 
Complaint and all three causes thereof, fail to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. 
The facts agreed upon by plaintiff's attorney are 
recited in the Pre-Trial Order, dated April 26, 1961 (R-
13) 
''. . . on the day in question and for some time 
prior to the accident ... the plaintiff had been up-
on the premises and had been doing some work 
there .... '' 
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"At the time of the incident in question the plain-
tiff was attempting to climb up one of the walls 
to assist in fastening the rafters and the rafter 
that he was attempting to pull himself up on was 
not fastened and as a result he fell, falling through 
the stairwell .... " 
In plaintiff's first two causes of actj or defendant 
is charged with the following acts of negligence: 
"The defendant w~as negligent in failing to cover 
a stairwell on the second story of the aforesaid 
building ... " (R. 27) 
The accident did not occur at the stairwell. It oc-
curred on a rafter in the ceiling. The plaintiff was in 
flight when he reached the stairwell and while a covering 
may have broken his fall, it may also have broken his 
back. 
"In failing to provide a safe passageway for the 
platntiJff." 
The accident did not occur in the passageway. The 
plaintiff had just climbed a wall before the accident. 
"failing to notify plaintiff of dange~rous and un.... 
safe conditions upon the premises whiJch wene 
known to the defendant and h~1s ~agents and em-
ployees, or in the exercise of .reasonable care could 
have been asce.rtained by them, and fa.iling to 
notify the plaintiff of unsafe and dangerous con-
ditions upon the pr.emises." 
The defendant owed plaintiff no duty to warn him 
of obvious and clearly discernible hazards. 
"There is no liability for injuries from dangers 
that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well 
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known to the person injured as they are to the 
owner or occupant." 38 .AM Jur. Negligence, §97 
pg. 757. 
''The liability of an owner or occupant ... must be 
predicated upon a superior knowledge ... It is 
when the perilous instrumentality is known to the 
owner or occupant and not known to the person 
injured, that a recovery is permitted." 
Sherman and Redfiled on Negligence, Vol. 2, Rev. 
Ed. Sec. 279, page 690 quotes the following language from 
a New York decision: 
". . . an employee cannot recover for injuries 
received while doing an act to eliminate the cause 
of the injury . . . The reason for this is that it 
would be manifestly absurd to hold a master to the 
duty of providing a safe place, when the very work 
in which the servant is engaged makes it unsafe. 
If a man is engaged in tearing down a house, he 
is constantly exposed to dangers of his own crea-
tion." 
Gibilterra vs. Rosen~awr Homes (1955) 19 N.J. 166, 
115 .Atl. 2nd 553.. 
"The general principle is that the landowner is 
under no duty to protect an employee of an in-
dependent contractor from the very hazard created 
by the doing of the work.'' 
Sec. 203, 2 Sherman and Redfield on Negligence, Rv. 
Ed. pg 473,474: 
"The doctrine of safe place ordinarily applies only 
to permanent conditions. It has no application 
where the place itself is safe~ but is rendered un-
10 
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safe by the negligence of other employees .... It 
has no application to a case where the prosecution 
of the work itself makes the place and creates the 
danger. It has no application where the very work 
which the servant is employed to do vs to make 
a dangerous place safe." 
Landing vs. Town of Fairlee, 112 Vt.127, 22 Atl. (2d) 
179: 
" 'The safe place doctrine' does not apply where 
the work in which the servant is engaged is of such 
a nature that its progress constantly produces 
changes in the conditions and surroundings, for 
in such a situation the hazards arising therefrom 
to which the servant is exposed are regarded as 
the ordinary dangers of his employment and con-
sequently are assumed by him.'' 
Furthermore, there can be no duty upon defendant, 
as general contractor, to warn plaintiff-owner, of condi-
tions which both are chargeable equally by law with 
knowing. 
At page 688 Sherman and Redfield, supra the text 
states: 
''The duty of the owner to the employee of an In-
dependent Contractor is the duty owed by an em-
ployer to one of his own employees. In effect this 
means that in case of the existence of physical 
defects in the owner's premises the owner is 
obliged to warn an employee of hidden defects 
of which the owner is aware or of which he should 
be aware in the exercise of reasonable care.'' 
11 
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An employee of a contractor, is a "business invitee" 
of the owner, especially where the owner retains control 
over the construction. 
Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408; 
Will,iams v. United Men's Shop, 317 Mass. 319, 58 
N.E. 2d, 2; 
LeVonas v. Acme Paper Go., 184 Md. 16, 40 Atl. 
2d, 43. 
Shell Oil Go. v. Blanks, (Tenn.) 330 S.W. 2d 569. 
20 ALR 2d 853. 
The fact that plaintiff retained complete control over 
the construction of his own hon1e is evident by his own 
testimony (Deposition, pg 19, Line 29 on) 
Q. "If I understand then, any time Mr. Larsen 
was to, for example, put in the ceiling, he 
would have to get three bids from some sub-
contractors~ 
A. "He didn't have to do it, I did, if I wanted, 
to see if I could do it cheaper. He already had 
his bid, but I would go out and see if I could 
find someone to do it cheaper. He already 
had his bid, but I would go out and see if I 
could find someone to do it cheaper than what 
he could do it." 
PAGE 20, Line 13: 
Q. Did you undertake to subcontract any par-
ticular portion of the construction, such as 
plumbing, wiring, or anything else 1 
12 
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A. ''No. I did get permits for the plumbing and 
the electrical. 
Q. "In your own name? 
A. ''Yes." 
Whether plaintiff wants to or not, he must face the 
fact that he was the owner and under the above "con-
tract'' in complete control of the construction. If, as he 
claims, he was also an employee of the contractor, then 
we reach the absurd conclusion that he (owner) owed 
himself (employee) a duty to warn himself of dangers 
which were obvious in the first place. 
The Honorable District Court was justified in dis-
missing the plaintiff's complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E,. MIDGLEY 
Attorney for Defendamt-
Respondent 
415 Boston Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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